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Post by Blargaliscious on Sept 20, 2018 23:13:54 GMT
I had an idle thought today: I wonder if any WM/H players study real world military tactics (as I believe some historical wargaming players do), and if so whether they find those tactics hold any applicability to the game? On a related note, does anyone have any recommendations for books to read about real world tactics that would be easy to understand for someone who doesn't really know anything about this sort of thing? To echo, expand, and clarify what others have said: It depends on what kind of a game you play. If you play a Steamroller scenario, then forget real tactics and strategies and treat it more like a game of chess - with a lot of variation in piece selection and capability. The scenario victory conditions with the scoring and the zones warp player's thinking away from tactics and more into game theory. You can apply military tactics, mostly in a superficial manner, but if you were to take a more in-depth approach you'll probably lose on scenario. If you play a basic line-up-and-kill-each-other caster kill game, without objectives and scoring, (like the way the game was before Steamroller) then, yes, you can start to mix in small unit tactics and start to apply some operational level thinking. If you remove the caster kill = game over aspect then you can really start to mix in some military thinking. Because of the amount of area that a unit's size is in relation to the battlefield in Warmachine I would recommend reading up on Greeks vs. Persians, Alexander the Great, and Roman battles. Forget the who, what, when, and where - concentrate on the how. At its heart Warmachine is a wargame, and if you play games that are like a battle then you can mix in tactics and strategies. When you introduce other-than-military victory conditions (points scoring, zones, caster-kill, etc.) then Warmachine starts to warp thinking more towards super-chess. But hey, that's just my opinion, I'm sure someone will tell me I'm wrong.
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Post by elshinare on Sept 21, 2018 4:41:10 GMT
Honestly it is really dependant on what type of tactics you are talking about, i.e. modern military or medieval tactics. Realistically, you can make plans for tactics to use, but the best laid plans can fail due to a miss of the dice. Hammer and anvil, pincer, and nutcracker are tactics that seem to be commonplace in the game, although I think most people don't realize they are using those.
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germanicus
Junior Strategist
No jokes round ear...
Posts: 358
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Post by germanicus on Sept 21, 2018 5:11:21 GMT
I wonder if you could apply the general principles of generalship though. Think the Art of War type of advice. And while psychology may have left the game rules, it still exists in your opponents. Break him (or her) and you'll win. While I agree with this in general, applied to WarMachine/Hordes, though, I can't really get behind this mindset, because it chucks out the core tenet of it being a game 'the goal is to win, the point is to have fun'. The moment you start trying to psyke your opponent out in a serious way, someone is not going to have fun. For chess, it's fine, because it's a professional endeavour and high level participants have at least basic psychological profiles on each other (like how Ivanchuk trolled Kasparov by playing 3. ... Bb4 only to 5. ... Bf8 making him almost flub the game) so they know what they're getting themselves into. [I'll preface the following with an apology, firstly that this may not apply to you and secondly in the event that I've misinterpreted what you said.] We don't want that in Warmachine, not in any way that's intentional at the very least, because we'll end up with a significant minority of the player base that will just basically refuse to play. The pay-off should first and foremost be the social aspect 'cos no-one's getting paid to play WMH on the Master's circuit are they(?), even in a competitive setting, because it is ultimately a game, win clean, lose gracefully. By all means, play the opponent and not his/her list, but don't ever do anything to deny them reason to enjoy what is essentially moving scale figures and rolling dice on a table. To me, psyching them out does precisely that. Skill in play should be borne out by managing your army without error, not by making your opponent doubt his/her ability to do the same. If you are a better player, mistakes show and (should be and/or) are capitalised upon and at least the loser can learn from it in post-match chat. Psyking out does nothing more than provide a declaration of 'man, you such a Kitty'. And this is between people that, in all likelihood, play each other on a regular basis... do this regularly enough and you will pretty much lose a part of your community. Some can shrug it off, some stop playing so regularly because it's not worth the continued effort, while some stop playing altogether because they can't stand the idea that a game equates stress. In my community, we have two particular players, myself and one half of a pair of identical twins. Draco (the twin) is a fairly good player, but he lacks confidence, so he usually just turns up to events where he can let himself disappear amongst the higher number of people than usually appear during game nights. You can tell he lacks confidence, as his laugh is often forced and he's perpetually nervy, and he's most at ease after his game has finished watching other people play or chatting with other players/event staff. The local ex-PG knows this and there's often a collective effort to encourage him (including his brother, who is easier to identify because he'll be the one who's talking!). Now, take me, I literally cannot get out of my own head and it takes a monumental effort just to deploy, so I just don't play even though I actually do want to. But I don't need anyone else getting into my head when I can easily screw myself over without their help, more so's the case when everyone is aware of this. So the moment PP and high level players encourage psychological struggle as a legitimate aspect of gameplay and I swear to every god over/under/in a parallel dimension to the Immoren sky both Draco and I will never pick a PP mini ever again. But hey, maybe that's what I need to do...
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Post by Charistoph on Sept 21, 2018 5:30:41 GMT
WMH is closer to pike and shot more than medieval or modern tactics. It is the nature of its steampunk style.
Either way, as mentioned, there are things which stay the course. Know your your army and you can provide a good game, know your enemy as yourself, and losses will be difficult.
Unfortunately, the most difficult aspect is you really cannot control the normal strategies which make many different tactics effective.
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Post by Soul Samurai on Sept 21, 2018 8:07:59 GMT
I had an idle thought today: I wonder if any WM/H players study real world military tactics (as I believe some historical wargaming players do), and if so whether they find those tactics hold any applicability to the game? On a related note, does anyone have any recommendations for books to read about real world tactics that would be easy to understand for someone who doesn't really know anything about this sort of thing? To echo, expand, and clarify what others have said: It depends on what kind of a game you play. If you play a Steamroller scenario, then forget real tactics and strategies and treat it more like a game of chess - with a lot of variation in piece selection and capability. The scenario victory conditions with the scoring and the zones warp player's thinking away from tactics and more into game theory. You can apply military tactics, mostly in a superficial manner, but if you were to take a more in-depth approach you'll probably lose on scenario. If you play a basic line-up-and-kill-each-other caster kill game, without objectives and scoring, (like the way the game was before Steamroller) then, yes, you can start to mix in small unit tactics and start to apply some operational level thinking. If you remove the caster kill = game over aspect then you can really start to mix in some military thinking. Because of the amount of area that a unit's size is in relation to the battlefield in Warmachine I would recommend reading up on Greeks vs. Persians, Alexander the Great, and Roman battles. Forget the who, what, when, and where - concentrate on the how. At its heart Warmachine is a wargame, and if you play games that are like a battle then you can mix in tactics and strategies. When you introduce other-than-military victory conditions (points scoring, zones, caster-kill, etc.) then Warmachine starts to warp thinking more towards super-chess. But hey, that's just my opinion, I'm sure someone will tell me I'm wrong.
I was thinking more in terms of medieval tactics; most firearms in Warmachine are probably closer to bows and ballista than to anything used in the last hundred years or so, and charging into melee is a major part of the game, but not to my understanding a major part of any modern conflict.
But having said that, I don't know how much of the core concepts of tactics are shared between medieval and modern times, so I didn't want to limit the discussion by trying to be too specific.
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germanicus
Junior Strategist
No jokes round ear...
Posts: 358
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Post by germanicus on Sept 21, 2018 9:36:59 GMT
I was thinking more in terms of medieval tactics; most firearms in Warmachine are probably closer to bows and ballista than to anything used in the last hundred years or so, and charging into melee is a major part of the game, but not to my understanding a major part of any modern conflict. But having said that, I don't know how much of the core concepts of tactics are shared between medieval and modern times, so I didn't want to limit the discussion by trying to be too specific. In terms of theory, tactics of conventional warfare haven't really changed over time just because of the development of weapons technology. There's a reason why most military academies and staff colleges still drill Alexandrian, Hannibalic, Pyrrhic and Roman tactics into students with the same fervour as anything from Napoleon or WWII onwards. It's just the applicability of the tactics, where to attack, what to attack with, when, with how much, contingencies should the attack(s) fail, situations dictated by the state of the battlefield (intended or known), intelligence of enemy composition and command and so on and so forth. Fundamentally, these questions (from which the tactics arise) remain the same, even if the answers change (i.e. hoplite phalanx or a battery of horse artillery). The main things that have changed from the dawn of mankind to the WWII era is scale, both in terms of materiele, manpower, range of engagement, destructive power of weapons and time to conduct battles. The rituals, typically understood by all sides, changed and the concept of offering battle died away for encounter combat and rolling battles during the 18th/19th centuries, along with the evolution of military intelligence (whether in its formalisation or its sophistication).
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Post by Charistoph on Sept 21, 2018 16:03:57 GMT
Heavy formations also died with air superiority and the machine gun. Most of the tactics have changed from mass formations to maneuverable skirmishing formations. The concepts of maneuver and application of power are still there, but go from a rank and file legion to a platoon or a squad. The crush of battle has inverted from that, too. Whereas you had to get close to do anything, engagements today can range for miles depending on the units in question.
WMH isn't in the Roman, or even in the Hundred Years War era. Nor is it in WWI, much less modern combat. It is closer to the 15th to 17th Century era warfare. Ranged weapons are still "short", but scarily effective. Bows can equal firearms in many circumstances, and the crush of melee is still quite effective. This is roughly called the "pike and shot" era of warfare. The grouped formations of musketry that we saw in the American Revolution haven't quite taken hold (and with the Trenchers, unlikely to), but ranged skirmishers are becoming more and more effective.
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germanicus
Junior Strategist
No jokes round ear...
Posts: 358
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Post by germanicus on Sept 21, 2018 18:32:51 GMT
Heavy formations also died with air superiority and the machine gun. Most of the tactics have changed from mass formations to maneuverable skirmishing formations. I would contend that these are modes of combat, not tactics. A corps still fought as a corps, whether it was a Napoleonic one or an Armoured one from WWII/Korean War. True, the formal mode of deployment of said formations fundamentally changes, but the direction of its constituent subdivisions when identifying and carrying out tactical objectives remains the same, along with the area of ground they can reasonably hold in the face of similar enemy numbers while still taking care of logistics. Quick question regarding that last point: frontage or between combatants? If frontage, you'll have to clarify your definition of 'for miles' as battles have had that sort of scale for centuries. If between combatants, it depends on how you define start of the engagement, as this can debatably occur upon visual (or detectable for modern combat systems) contact. We need to remember that battle composes a remarkably insignificant proportion of war, and pre-battle/pre-first salvo manoeuvres and preparation account just as much towards its result as the fighting itself, if not more.
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Post by Charistoph on Sept 21, 2018 18:51:25 GMT
Heavy formations also died with air superiority and the machine gun. Most of the tactics have changed from mass formations to maneuverable skirmishing formations. I would contend that these are modes of combat, not tactics. A corps still fought as a corps, whether it was a Napoleonic one or an Armoured one from WWII/Korean War. True, the formal mode of deployment of said formations fundamentally changes, but the direction of its constituent subdivisions when identifying and carrying out tactical objectives remains the same, along with the area of ground they can reasonably hold in the face of similar enemy numbers while still taking care of logistics. How a corps fights today is not like it fought in the Napoleonic or even WWII, though it is closer to WWII. The application of motorized armor, flight, drones, GPS, and numerous other technologies allows for different applications of tactics that were unavailable even at the time of Grenada or Desert Storm, to say nothing about what Napoleon or Alexander had to deal with. Quick question regarding that last point: frontage or between combatants? If frontage, you'll have to clarify your definition of 'for miles' as battles have had that sort of scale for centuries. If between combatants, it depends on how you define start of the engagement, as this can debatably occur upon visual (or detectable for modern combat systems) contact. We need to remember that battle composes a remarkably insignificant proportion of war, and pre-battle/pre-first salvo manoeuvres and preparation account just as much towards its result as the fighting itself, if not more. Thanks to the advent of radar, rockets, and jet engines, the engagement between aircraft will often cover miles, easily. Tanks can fire accurately for miles, depending on the terrain, and move rapidly over that terrain. Infantry rarely ever get as close as they did in the Hundred Years war, partially due to sniping and mortars, as well as automatic weapons within that combat sphere. I guess it is more a point of population density within an engagement is far lower today then at Agincourt, Waterloo, or even WWII. If you bring your army too close together, and have lost air superiority, then it will get pounded mercilessly.
The concepts are there, because you never know when an old idea can be brought in anew. Melee combat was largely relegated to the rear for some time, but as we progress, we are realizing that we need it again. But how you arranged to dig in a unit for Waterloo does nothing to match what you would do with a unit today. The concept of digging in applies, but the method and what you have to counter with it has changed appreciably.
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germanicus
Junior Strategist
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Post by germanicus on Sept 22, 2018 7:24:37 GMT
I'll preface the following with an apology insomuch that I keep having to remind myself that I am borderline totally ignorant of command, control & communications systems and almost all weapons technology post-WWII, as that clearly colours my perspective. Also that everything I say and have said relates only to conventional warfare. How a corps fights today is not like it fought in the Napoleonic or even WWII, though it is closer to WWII. The application of motorized armor, flight, drones, GPS, and numerous other technologies allows for different applications of tactics that were unavailable even at the time of Grenada or Desert Storm, to say nothing about what Napoleon or Alexander had to deal with. No argument there in the first bit. 'How' a military unit (irrespective of size) functions has changed continuously thanks to the evolution of weapons/defence technology. How a military unit is used (as distinct from detailed deployment, as that's kind of obvious) has not changed in terms of being tactical tools. I'll apologise for being real nitpicky and picking up on a point of semantics, but you mention 'allows for different applications of tactics', which is true... but the tactics themselves aren't different from era to era. Their relevance may have changed (linear tactics, defence in depth, encirclement etc.) but conceptually, tactics haven't changed, though how they're implemented is. Yeah, I disregarded aerial combat due to diminished relevance to WMH, though that said, the importance of aerial superiority/supremacy is a thing to be considered, I suppose. Good point regarding population density, as well as modern warfare's propensity for continual situational development since holding ground these days is an inherently more dangerous than before. Consequently, tactics are applied to a much larger physical scale despite the fact that tactical objectives remain on the same scale owing to how quickly modern armed forces can move and how precisely they can act. Regarding digging in... might be a bad example, as tactics tend to be a great deal more abstract. Supplementary methods as dictated by available resources and technology exist primarily to make tactics more or less viable in the face of what the enemy can bring. Digging in can, broadly, be associated with fortifying a position, and a commander will decide whether or not to based on convention and knowledge of circumstances, neither of which affect his/her available tactics. Fortifying would serve primarily to increase the likelihood of a successful delaying tactic (whether or not a counterattack follows). How much that increase actually is depends on the resources (whether of time, labour or technology) available to conduct said fortification and the resources available to attack it, which naturally changes with era and operational/strategic circumstances. Rather, it may be more pertinent to use a tactical concept such as outflanking (defined as attacking from beyond the enemy flank as discrete from securing the localised superiority/supremacy on a flank). This ceased to be a tactic and became an operational goal as early as the German Wars of Unification/American Civil War (there's some argument to be made for as early as the Napoleonic Wars) because the tactical front of a unit became such a fluid thing that an army covered its flanks in battle as a matter of course (against all reasonable expectations). Re: Battle of Sedan 1870... the Prussian goal was to outflank the French in the lead up by cutting off the Army of Chalons from Metz, but this was done by operational manoeuvre, not tactics. What most casual observers often don't realise is that the battle was fought with the French with their backs to the Belgian border (i.e. the French were trying to attack towards Paris). The tactics they employed at the battle were simply: artillery corps... pound that division into the ground... done? Next! And the Prussians just rolled up the French line after driving out the defenders of La Moncelle. Nowadays, outflanking would similarly be employed as an operational goal precisely because of how fast a mechanised army can cover ground, the extent (or rather, lack thereof) to which an army's flank exists in terms of tactical deployment and the reasonable timescale for which the manoeuvre can be responded to. That's my take on it at least...
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Cyel
Junior Strategist
Posts: 685
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Post by Cyel on Sept 22, 2018 10:53:04 GMT
I'd say no - everything in the game is too abstract. Victory conditions, morale, ranges and speeds, survivability. It's an abstract game with flavour, not an attempt at simulation.
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Post by Charistoph on Sept 22, 2018 17:31:48 GMT
No argument there in the first bit. 'How' a military unit (irrespective of size) functions has changed continuously thanks to the evolution of weapons/defence technology. How a military unit is used (as distinct from detailed deployment, as that's kind of obvious) has not changed in terms of being tactical tools. I'll apologise for being real nitpicky and picking up on a point of semantics, but you mention 'allows for different applications of tactics', which is true... but the tactics themselves aren't different from era to era. Their relevance may have changed (linear tactics, defence in depth, encirclement etc.) but conceptually, tactics haven't changed, though how they're implemented is. The relevance of a specific tactic is what causes a change in tactics. The machine gun made the mass infantry charge pointless. Artillery and airpower made maneuvering and engaging in rank and file murderous.
The concept of flanking is about applying more power in to an enemy unit. This was important in days of the Spartan and just as important today. However, instead of flanking into melee infantry with cavalry, you flank ranged infantry with ranged infantry to deny them cover from your ranged weapons. Alternatively, you bring in mortars or armor to dig the unit out of cover through brute force.
An interesting little concept of how tactics get changed, or maybe misunderstood so they get changed, is the First Battle of Bull Run during the American Civil War. Both commanders were avid students of Napoleon who presented the concept of hitting the left flank as being a solid doctrine. So in the first battle between the Union and Virginia, they took all their force to hit the left flank of the other's position, only to find they weren't there to be hit. They didn't understand that you have to pin the unit down so they could be flanked in the first place, so after several rounds of playing ring-around-the-rosie, they discarded this tactic in favor of the rush.
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germanicus
Junior Strategist
No jokes round ear...
Posts: 358
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Post by germanicus on Sept 23, 2018 6:08:31 GMT
The relevance of a specific tactic is what causes a change in tactics. The machine gun made the mass infantry charge pointless. Artillery and airpower made maneuvering and engaging in rank and file murderous. The concept of flanking is about applying more power in to an enemy unit. This was important in days of the Spartan and just as important today. However, instead of flanking into melee infantry with cavalry, you flank ranged infantry with ranged infantry to deny them cover from your ranged weapons. Alternatively, you bring in mortars or armor to dig the unit out of cover through brute force. That was exactly my point (from my previous post), insomuch that 'flanking' (or rather, breaking through a flank, more generally speaking), as a continually relevant concept, hasn't changed a whit (respective to the scale of the battle-zone) in terms of the movement of combat elements in how it is used as a battlefield tactic (or as an operational method). How those combat elements achieve their tactical objectives/localised superiority has changed for already mentioned reasons. I think this is a case of semantics insomuch that - your stance: what tactics that are used have changed over time (plus & via microscopic view); my stance: what the objectives of those particular tactics are hasn't changed over time (plus & via macroscopic view). Personally, I think there is a case for saying we're both correct. Broadly speaking, tactics of years gone by have not changed in terms of what commanders seek to achieve, but evolving battlefield circumstances have made particular tactics more or less viable (i.e. relevant to conventional warfare of the day) as time has gone necessitating wildly varying levels of adaptation (reiterating). You make reference to 'engaging in rank and file', which is a microscopic view of the battlefield, relevant for (effectively) millennia up until the mid/late 19th century, when the precision of small arms and the much increased prevalence of long ranged (of increasing accuracy) spelled the downfall of line of battle formations (again, just reiterating). The rise of the rifle (& then automatic weapons) as defensive tactical weapons and artillery (mobile or otherwise) as offensive tactical weapons is a point of confusion (maybe for me, too), because I believe that the use of the weapons are dictated by tactics, not the other way around (which, correct me if I'm wrong, you believe). Thus, whether it's Mago's detachment at Trebbia, Seydlitz' cavalry at Rossbach (Leuthen's a bit extreme), Leith & Pakenham at Salamanca, the Crown Prince at Koniggratz or pretty much everything about Op Compass, strategic considerations and battleground circumstances dictate choice of tactics, mode of combat (doctrine... that was the word I was looking for) and immediately available resources dictate conduct of tactics, all of the above dictate viability of tactics. But the abstract definition (individually speaking... or even of the whole overriding concept of tactics, at that), relevance to a situation, circumstantial viability, place (as occupied within a commander's skillset), but above all, end purpose of tactics have not changed much. Perhaps I'm taking too detached a view of things, since the phrase 'tactics change' is more complicated than most care to acknowledge, and it runs into the problem of the plethora of knock-on effects when considering related operational (though more conceptually speaking, this can go so far as to include debating when in time these became relevant, which I maintain is much earlier than usually thought or implied), strategic and grand strategic goals, especially since a lot of wars invariably conflate two or more of these scales owing to time/geographical/political factors. Not to sound overly contrary, since I'm not especially au fait with the American Civil War, but my understanding was that McDowell opted for a plan of battle that was ambitious, but ultimately far too complex for his army to carry out, while Beauregard actually did want to make a demonstration before the Union line, but his orders got lost in the post, as it were. Though I do think you're right where you mention 'misunderstood so they get changed', the state of both Union and Confederate armies obliged a sort of semi-reversion due to a lack of training and wartime experience for the majority of soldiers. But this raises the idea of the 'industrial' war, insomuch that for the first time, the success or failure of battlefield tactics increasingly had less effect on strategic outcomes because the idea of strategic reserves being available operationally suddenly became possible, which would have an effect on how highly (or not) battlefield commanders would value 'tactical flamboyance' as it were and how highly (or not) commanders on a front of war would fear attritional losses. You can tell the Prussians didn't pay any attention to this.
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Post by Charistoph on Sept 23, 2018 14:45:39 GMT
Semantics is literally the study of meaning in a language. So, yeah, we are exploring each other's meaning.
I do not consider an objective (whether short term or long term) to be a tactic. Digging out a unit is an objective. Flanking is a tactic. Bombardment is a tactic. Infiltration is a tactic. Sniping is a tactic. Holding reserves is a strategy & a tactic.
To put it simply, a tactic is any mode of procedure for gaining advantage or success. It can also apply to the art of disposing of forces during battle. Killing unit A before unit B is a tactic. How you kill unit A is a tactic. The elimination of unit A is an objective.
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germanicus
Junior Strategist
No jokes round ear...
Posts: 358
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Post by germanicus on Sept 24, 2018 4:09:20 GMT
Semantics is literally the study of meaning in a language. So, yeah, we are exploring each other's meaning. I do not consider an objective (whether short term or long term) to be a tactic. Digging out a unit is an objective. Flanking is a tactic. Bombardment is a tactic. Infiltration is a tactic. Sniping is a tactic. Holding reserves is a strategy & a tactic. To put it simply, a tactic is any mode of procedure for gaining advantage or success. It can also apply to the art of disposing of forces during battle. Killing unit A before unit B is a tactic. How you kill unit A is a tactic. The elimination of unit A is an objective. ... ... ... You know, I've come to a realisation, reading back this exchange... I'm a Firetrucking moron. Happens every time I start typing out stuff I believe I have an inkling about, and got fixated with tactical manoeuvres that I disregarded small unit tactics and the balance of tactical functions. In so saying, I owe you (as well as everyone else who wasted their time reading my posts) an apology. You are free to disregard... most of what I said. *saunters off to inadvertently waste someone else's time*
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